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SCIENTER AFTER TELLABS 
INTRODUCTION 
Private securities fraud actions once prospered in the American federal 
court system. However, as more shareholders brought these time-
consuming and money-consuming actions to court, judges began to take 
notice of their frivolous and abusive nature.1 To remedy these perceived 
abuses, Congress passed a sweeping reform in the form of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).2 The PSLRA modified 
several aspects of securities fraud litigation3 and was intended to “curb 
frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to 
recover on meritorious claims.”4 Most notably, in seeking to unify the 
scienter standard among differing circuits, the PSLRA raised the pleading 
requirement, which had formerly followed Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP).5 The new standard required a complainant to plead 
facts with sufficient particularity to create a “strong inference” of scienter.6 
Although the PSLRA was modeled on the standard employed by the 
Second Circuit, Congress expressly rejected codifying the Second Circuit’s 
two-prong test interpreting “strong inference.”7 Moreover, Congress failed 
to set forth how a “strong inference” may be established.8 
After the passage of the PSLRA, circuit courts diverged in construing 
the term “strong inference,”9 and as a result of such discrepancies, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.10 In an effort to harmonize the circuits, the 
Court in Tellabs established that the pleaded facts in their totality must 
imply a scienter that is “cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference of nonfraudulent intent.”11 The Court believed it had found a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Thomas O. Gorman, Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd: Pleading a Strong 
Inference of Scienter 153, 159 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Ser. No. 11072) (2007). 
 2. Id.; Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2006) (mandating the court pick the lead plaintiff of the class 
action); id. § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring a plaintiff to “specify each statement alleged to have been 
misleading” and the reasons why); id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (staying discovery during pendency of a 
12(b)(6) motion). 
 4. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). 
 5. Before the enactment of PSLRA, Rule 9(b) applied to actions brought under the federal 
securities laws. E.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
 7. Gorman, supra note 1, at 162. 
 8. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314; see also Gorman, supra note 1, at 162. 
 9. See, e.g., Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001) (adopting a “quantum” 
of the evidence approach as opposed to focusing on the type of evidence); In re Silicon Graphics 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting motive and opportunity test and 
requiring that each particularized allegation give rise to a “strong inference of deliberate 
recklessness”); Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp. 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring either 
motive and opportunity or recklessness to meet scienter). 
 10. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 317. 
 11. Id. at 314. 
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workable definition of the strong inference standard that achieved 
Congress’ intent of the PSLRA.12 This note argues that while many circuit 
courts modified their standards in consideration of Tellabs, these changes 
were merely superficial and did not materially alter the frameworks each 
circuit already had established. However, all is not lost; Tellabs was able to 
unify many of the intermediate circuits, particularly regarding the “motive 
and opportunity test” for establishing scienter. Even though the Supreme 
Court tacitly stripped the motive and opportunity test of its value, the 
Court’s seeming desire to stop usage of this test has not resonated with all 
circuits.13 Because the Supreme Court directed all federal courts to apply a 
holistic approach when reviewing allegations for scienter, circuit courts are 
able to disguise their former tests within the holistic review. As such, many 
circuits only superficially adopted the Tellabs decision.14 However, 
although recent discussions speculate as to the continued use of the motive 
and opportunity test,15 practically all circuits, apart from the Second Circuit, 
have, explicitly or implicitly, rejected that method as an independent means 
to scienter.16 
To place the Supreme Court’s Tellabs ruling in its proper context, Part I 
of this note lays out the foundation of securities fraud pleadings before the 
PSLRA, and Congress’ rationale behind such reform. Part II focuses on the 
Supreme Court decision in Tellabs itself: its facts, holding, and the 
interpretation given to it on remand by the Seventh Circuit. This Part 
illustrates the Supreme Court’s effort to adhere to the goals set out in the 
PSLRA. Part III analyzes the various approaches adopted by the circuit 
courts after Tellabs. This Part explores the paths each of the circuits has 
taken17 and examines whether the new approaches are consistent with both 
the spirit of Tellabs and the intent of the PSLRA. The note concludes by 
discussing whether the varying circuit courts have harmonized their 
preexisting frameworks with the Tellabs decision. Ultimately, even though 
the circuit courts were putatively adapting to Tellabs, few of the standards 
adopted by the circuits were changed. It is this note’s position that the 
Tellabs standard did not achieve the complete harmonization the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 322. 
 13. The Second Circuit still adamantly permits a showing of motive and opportunity as a 
separate method to meet the requisite scienter. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, 
Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 14. See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 209–10 (5th Cir. 
2009); Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 928 (8th Cir. 2008); ATSI Commc’ns, 493 F.3d at 99. 
 15. See, e.g., Marvin Lowenthal, Note, Revitalizing Motive and Opportunity Pleading After 
Tellabs, 109 MICH. L. REV. 625, 656 (2011). 
 16. See, e.g., Avaya, 564 F.3d at 276; Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 
1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
 17. Circuits that have shifted their scienter analysis similarly are categorized together in order 
to provide a clearer examination. 
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Court intended, due to the test’s holistic all-encompassing nature. However, 
it did establish the boundaries for a reliable approach to securities fraud 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, while uniformity among the circuits is a virtue, 
chiefly for parties seeking predictability and consistency in judgments, so is 
judicial discretion especially for nuanced concepts.18 The interpretive 
flexibility left by the Tellabs decision may, in fact, be a positive feature, 
and may be enough to take care of the concerns that originally caused 
Congress to enact the PSLRA.  
I. SECURITIES FRAUD LAWS 
A. THE LAW BEFORE THE PSLRA 
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only 
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief”19 in order to properly bring an action before the court. 
Recently, the Supreme Court heightened this permissive standard requiring 
that a pleading be made on “plausible grounds”.20 In addition, rule 9(b) has 
long required that allegations of fraud or mistake must be set forth with 
“particularity,”21 meaning a plaintiff must allege the specific circumstances 
constituting the fraud, but need only to show general allegations of the 
defendant’s state of mind.22 Because only generalized facts are needed to 
prove scienter, circuit courts diverged greatly on the requisite standard.23 
However, due to this divergence and the increased filing of frivolous 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1561, 1613 (2003) (explaining that the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure envisioned 
a system that allowed for judicial discretion). 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 20. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that at least in antitrust 
cases, a plaintiff must plead “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence of illegal agreement”). 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 22. Id. 
 23. The circuit courts split into three distinct approaches in interpreting the requisite scienter 
standard from Rule 9(b). The Second Circuit’s more demanding approach, which required a 
plaintiff to plead facts that give rise to a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent can be satisfied 
either by establishing facts of motive-and-opportunity or recklessness. See, e.g., In re Time 
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1993). This approach is currently followed by 
both the First and Third Circuits. See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 196–201 
(1st Cir. 1999); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir. 1999). Another 
path was the Ninth Circuit’s more permissive approach, which required plaintiffs to plead the 
requisite state of mind generally, without regard to the specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). See, 
e.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545–46 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. 
Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996). Lastly, most circuits adopted the intermediate 
approach, which required a plaintiff to plead a “reasonable basis” that the requisite scienter 
existed. See, e.g., In re HealthCare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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attorney-led investor suits24 and strike suits,25 the federal court system 
became inundated with these types of private actions;26 not to mention the 
negative impact that varying circuit standards had on plaintiffs’ propensity 
to forum shop—i.e., filing in the most favorable jurisdiction for their case.27 
In response, Congress held hearings to reform the nation’s securities 
litigation system, and ultimately passed the PSLRA.28 
B. EFFECTS OF THE PSLRA 
The PSLRA curbed “nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket 
defendants, vexatious discovery requests, and ‘manipulation by class action 
lawyers’”29 by imposing both procedural and substantive controls.30 One 
significant reform imposed a uniform and stringent scienter standard 
modeled on the Second Circuit approach.31 The PSLRA stated that private 
securities complaint allegations must: (1) “specify each statement alleged to 
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading;” and (2) “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”32 
Congress, however, failed to provide clear and precise guidance on what 
satisfied its “strong inference” standard.33 Furthermore, while Congress 
adopted part of the Second Circuit’s scienter approach, it refrained from 
specifically codifying the circuit’s case law interpreting that standard.34 As 
a result, even though the goals set forth in the PSLRA were clear, the 
method of its application was not.35 
After Congress enacted the PSLRA, circuit courts were left to their own 
devices to apply Congress’ new standard.36 The Second Circuit remained 
                                                                                                                 
 24. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. A frivolous suit 
is “[a] lawsuit having no legal basis, often filed to harass or extort money from the defendant.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). 
 25. A strike suit is “[a] suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid claim, brought 
either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). 
 26. Chauncey M. Lane, Comment, To Plead or Not to Plead: The Plaintiff’s Growing Burden 
in Securities Class Action Litigation, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 615, 627 (2009). 
 27. James D. Cox et al., Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in 
Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 439. 
 28. H.R.REP. NO. 104-369, at 2–6 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 29. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995)). 
 30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
 32. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2). 
 33. John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 
39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 623 (2008). 
 34. Gorman, supra note 1, at 162; Cox et al., supra note 27, at 431. 
 35. See Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 623–26. 
 36. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Silicon 
Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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faithful to the two-pronged test it had established prior to the PSLRA,37 
while the Ninth Circuit modified its standard from one of the most liberal 
scienter requirements to a test even stricter than the Second Circuit’s.38 
The Ninth Circuit required that a “private securities plaintiff . . . must 
plead, in great detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of 
deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct” and that “[i]n order to show 
a strong inference of deliberate recklessness, plaintiffs must state facts that 
come closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to mere motive and 
opportunity.”39 In In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, the 
Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the “motive and opportunity” test used by 
the Second Circuit and required, at minimum, “particular[ized] facts giving 
rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness.”40 The court stated that 
Congress “expressly rejected” codifying the Second Circuit standard in its 
entirety, and since it did not, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress must 
have intended its standard to be more stringent than that of the Second 
Circuit.41 
Other circuits adopted standards that fell between the two extremes of 
the Second and the Ninth Circuit tests.42 Most notable of these intermediate 
circuits was the Seventh Circuit, whose less stringent standard countered 
the Sixth Circuit’s “most plausible” standard, and ultimately presented the 
scienter issue before the Supreme Court in Tellabs.43 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Press, 166 F.3d at 538 (allowing either facts of “motive and opportunity” or 
recklessness to satisfy the requisite scienter). The Third Circuit adopted a position similar to that 
of the Second Circuit’s. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 38. Compare In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1554 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring 
only circumstances of fraud, excluding scienter, to be pled with particularity), with In re Silicon 
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974 (requiring, at minimum, particularized facts showing a strong inference 
of deliberate recklessness). 
 39. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 979. 
 42. The First Circuit held that the PSLRA did not change its previous case law on scienter and 
that the court will conduct individualized case-by-case analyses “to determine whether the 
allegations were sufficient to support scienter.” Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 196 
(1st Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit held the Second Circuit’s motive and opportunity test, 
standing alone, is insufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter, but that evidence of 
motive and opportunity plus more could potentially suffice. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 
F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit focused on the “quantum” of proof rather 
than on the type of evidence. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001). The 
Fourth Circuit, Eight Circuit, and Tenth Circuit all adopted a position similar to the Sixth Circuit’s 
position by looking at whether the plaintiff’s allegations, as a whole, give rise to a strong 
inference of scienter. See Ottoman v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345–46 (4th 
Cir. 2003); Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 
2001); Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 43. Compare Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., v. Tellabs, 437 F.3d 588, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]e will allow the complaint to survive if it alleges facts from which, if true, a reasonable 
person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent.”), with Helwig, 251 F.3d at 
554 (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the inference of scienter is more plausible than any 
exculpatory justification). 
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II. THE TELLABS DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
A. SUPREME COURT DECISION 
1. Facts 
In Tellabs, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.44 Plaintiff-shareholders brought a class 
action suit against Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs) and against Richard Notebaert, the 
CEO and president during the class period, which was between December 
11, 2000 and June 19, 2001.45 The shareholders accused both Tellabs and 
Notebaert of “engaging in a scheme to deceive the investing public about 
the true value of Tellabs’ stock.”46 The main issue rested on the 
shareholders’ claim that the company and Notebaert had issued 
misstatements about the company’s new device, TITAN 6500. These 
misstatements allegedly gave shareholders the impression that the products 
were still in demand and that a new version would be ready for delivery 
soon. Thus, shareholders relied on this information to their financial 
detriment.47 
Specifically, shareholders claimed that beginning on December 11, 
2000, Notebaert continuously impressed onto them the company’s strong 
financial situation when he knew the opposite to be true.48 In the following 
months, Notebaert and Tellabs, allegedly knowingly issued false statements 
about the current demand for Tellabs’ products and prospects for its new 
product.49 Finally, in March 2001, signs of Tellabs’ unhealthy financial 
situation appeared and the company was forced to reduce its projected 
monthly sales statements until June 19, 2001, when Tellabs disclosed that 
demand for its product actually had been dropping significantly.50 After the 
disclosure, the price of Tellabs’ stock dropped almost fifty-two dollars.51 
A year and a half later, “[o]n December 3, 2002, the Shareholders filed 
a class action [against Tellabs] in the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois.”52 The complaint alleged that Tellabs and Notebaert 
violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 
and SEC Rule 10b-5.53 The complaint also alleged that Notebaert acted as a 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 308–09 (2007). 
 45. Id. at 308. Plaintiffs also brought claims against other Tellabs executive but many of the 
claims were dismissed. Thus, the Court only focused on the allegations as they relate to Notebaert. 
 46. Id. at 315. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 315–16. 
 50. Id. at 316. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (citing Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2004)). 
 53. Id. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2010). 
2011] Scienter After Tellabs 533 
“controlling person” under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act and was 
“derivatively liable for the company’s fraudulent [misstatements].”54 
“Tellabs moved to dismiss the [action] on the ground that the 
[s]hareholders” did not meet the requisite particularity as stated in the 
PSLRA, thus advocating the court to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s standard that 
requires plaintiffs to show that the scienter inference is more likely than 
non-culpable inferences.55 
2. Procedural History 
The district court agreed with Tellabs and dismissed the complaint 
without prejudice for failure to meet the heightened pleadings standard.56 
The shareholders then amended their complaint to include specific facts 
about Notebaert’s scienter that were gathered, in part, from numerous 
additional confidential sources.57 Nevertheless, the district court again 
dismissed the amended complaint because plaintiffs still did not sufficiently 
allege Notebaert’s scienter.58 
The shareholders appealed the dismissal, which the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court affirmed that the facts 
sufficiently pleaded the misleading statements,59 but reversed the district 
court regarding scienter,60 holding that the plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged 
[facts] that Notebaert acted with the requisite state of mind.”61 The Seventh 
Circuit recognized that although the PSLRA “unequivocally raise[d] the bar 
for pleading scienter,” upon examination of all the allegations of the entire 
complaint, that bar was met in the case.62 Further, the court explicitly 
refused to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s scienter test—in which the “plaintiffs 
are entitled only to the most plausible of competing inferences.”63 The 
Seventh Circuit steadfastly maintained that a plaintiff met the scienter 
standard so long as “a reasonable person could infer that the defendant 
acted with the required intent.”64 Because this literalized a difference of 
opinion among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the 
case.65 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 316. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). 
 55. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 316–26. 
 56. Id. at 316. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 317 (citing Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 595–600 (7th 
Cir. 2006)). 
 60. Id. (citing Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 603–05). 
 61. Id. (citing Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 602). 
 62. Id. (quoting Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 601–05). 
 63. Id. (quoting Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 601). 
 64. Id. (quoting Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 602). See also Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 633–
34. 
 65. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 317–18. 
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3. Holding 
Upon an examination of the litigation system and the legislative process 
behind the reform, the Supreme Court held that the test for “strong 
inference” must be stricter than the one applied by the Seventh Circuit, so 
as to achieve the goals of the PSLRA.66 The Court emphasized that 
Congress modeled the PSLRA standard after one of the most stringent 
standards available, and because of such, the intent of Congress must have 
been to make all the circuits’ standards stricter.67 The Supreme Court 
offered the following prescriptions: first, when faced with a motion to 
dismiss a § 10(b) action, the “court must accept all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true.”68 Second, the court must examine the complaint in its 
entirety.69 This inquiry must consist of examining all the facts alleged, 
collectively, and whether as a whole, the facts give rise to a “strong 
inference” of scienter.70 The court should not consider each allegation 
individually or in isolation.71 The Supreme Court defined a “strong 
inference” as one that is compelling, cogent, and more than reasonable.72 
Lastly, the Court established that the strength of the inference could not be 
examined in a vacuum; rather a comparison between the culpable and non-
culpable explanations is necessary.73 Thus, the requisite scienter standard 
must be one that is collectively “cogent and compelling . . . in light of other 
explanations” (Tellabs rule).74 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs not only heightened the 
definition of strong inference, but also the context in which the inference is 
to be viewed.75 A merely reasonable or permissible inference of scienter is 
no longer sufficient for pleading securities fraud. The Court reasoned that 
because determining the strength of an inference is an inherently 
comparative analysis, the inferences of scienter must be weighed against all 
plausible, non-culpable inferences as well.76 Furthermore, the Court noted 
the inference does not need to be irrefutable or even the most plausible of 
competing inferences, but that it does need to be at least as strong as other 
non-culpable inferences.77 In deciding on a holistic approach for examining 
the allegations, the Supreme Court adopted the position held by many of the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 318–24. 
 67. Id. at 321–23. 
 68. Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 637 (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 
 73. Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 637 (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324). 
 74. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 
 75. Id. at 323–24. See also Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 636–38. 
 76. See Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 637 (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324–25). 
 77. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 
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intermediate circuits after the enactment of the PSLRA;78 but the Court’s 
additional requirement that the inference must be a comparative analysis 
allowed the Court to differentiate its stance, and avoid choosing from the 
competing approaches of the various circuit courts.79 The Supreme Court 
armed the Seventh Circuit with these new instructions on remand.80 
B. SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION ON REMAND 
On remand, the Seventh Circuit was obligated to examine whether the 
plaintiffs’ complaint had met the new interpretation of “strong inference” of 
scienter.81 As the Seventh Circuit’s standard prior to Tellabs was looser 
than the one adopted by the Supreme Court, one might have expected the 
complaint not to survive the new heightened standard.82 However, in a 
majority opinion penned by Judge Posner, the court found that even under 
the heightened standard, the plaintiffs’ complaint survived the 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss and once again reversed the district court’s dismissal.83 
The court applied the Tellabs rule by first examining all the allegations 
holistically.84 In its thorough analysis, the court found two plausible 
inferences: one was a non-culpable inference drawn from the upper-level 
management failing to catch lower employees’ accidental overstatements or 
knowing embezzlements; the other, that the company knowingly made 
misstatements sufficiently establishing an inference of scienter.85 Here, the 
court held that the inference of corporate scienter was not only as likely as a 
non-culpable inference, but more likely.86 Moreover, the court held that it 
was “exceedingly unlikely” that Notebaert, the CEO of the company, was 
unaware of the problems with its leading product.87 In light of all this, the 
court considered the inference of scienter cogent and much more likely than 
the non-culpable inference.88 
In complying with the Tellabs rule, Judge Posner expressed discomfort 
with the level of factual analysis the rule required pre-discovery, stating that 
“[t]o judges raised on notice pleading, the idea of drawing a ‘strong 
                                                                                                                 
 78. These circuits all used approaches similar to the quantum of the evidence, totality approach 
that the Supreme Court adopted. See Ottoman v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 
345–46 (4th Cir. 2003); Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659–
661 (8th Cir. 2001); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001); Philadelphia v. 
Fleming Co., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 79. Cox et al., supra note 27, at 438. 
 80. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329. 
 81. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 82. Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 684–85. 
 83. Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710–12. See also Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 684–89. 
 84. Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 685–89. 
 85. Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 707. See also Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 686. 
 86. Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 711. See also Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 686. 
 87. Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 711. 
 88. Id. at 710–11. 
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inference’ from factual allegations is mysterious.”89 Posner emphasized that 
in order to proceed with such an analysis, more work would be required 
from the defendant to show a non-culpable inference, a result “outwardly at 
odds with the PSLRA’s goal of saving a defendant from the expense and 
burden of answering a complaint until it has been deemed to pass muster.”90 
This discomfort with the Tellabs rule has been expressed by other circuits 
after lower courts attempted to apply a rule consistent with both Tellabs and 
the case law established within their respective circuits.91 
III. APPLICATION OF THE TELLABS RULE 
After the Tellabs decision, the circuit courts struggled to reconcile the 
decision with their own standards.92 While the Tellabs rule did provide a 
general direction for the circuit courts to follow, it left considerable leeway 
for judicial discretion and interpretation.93 The circuit courts used varying 
methods to apply Tellabs; some merely tacked on Tellabs’ holistic approach 
as an additional prong,94 while others continued to permit alternative 
methods of establishing scienter, such as the “bare allegation of motive and 
opportunity [which, most likely, would] not meet Tellabs’ call for a cogent 
and compelling inference.”95 A few circuits, however, conformed their 
analyses to fall squarely within the four corners of Tellabs.96 These 
differing attempts to reconcile Tellabs are analyzed below. 
A. THE SECOND, THIRD, AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS 
The Tellabs rule instructed lower courts to compare an inference of 
scienter with competing inferences ensuring that the former is cogent and 
compelling enough to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.97 
However, before Tellabs was decided, many circuits had already 
established alternative methods to show scienter, such as by pleading facts 
of motive and opportunity, or strong circumstantial evidence of 
recklessness or conscious misbehavior.98 These circuits have continued to 
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use alternative methods of establishing scienter, reading Tellabs’ 
comparative, holistic approach as merely another available method.99 
In Elam v. Neidorff, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 
complaint for “failure to plead a strong inference of scienter as required by 
the PSLRA and . . . Tellabs.”100 Neidorff was a securities fraud action 
brought against Centene Corporation (Centene), a middleman for Medicaid 
recipients and the government, and certain executive officers.101 When 
Centene made its quarterly reports, it failed to account for possible 
unexpected claims liability. This misrepresented the company’s income, 
which was further harmed by the company promoting its accurate medical 
claims estimations.102 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, the court noted 
that the “pleading fail[ed] to point to any contemporaneous reports, witness 
statements, or any information that had actually been provided to 
defendants . . . that indicated that Centene would need to increase estimated 
medical costs,”103 and thus, lacked the requisite specificity. 
Superficially, it appears that the Eighth Circuit complied with the 
Tellabs rule in affirming the dismissal, but closer scrutiny shows that the 
court actually entertained three distinct ways of establishing a strong 
scienter inference: (1) by pleading “facts establishing a mental state 
embracing an intent to deceive; (2) from conduct [that] amounts to severe 
recklessness; or (3) from allegations of motive and opportunity.”104 While 
the first and second methods seem consistent with Tellabs, the Supreme 
Court never mentioned a motive and opportunity test as a possible 
alternative to satisfy the strong inference requirement.105 Furthermore, 
under the Tellabs rule, merely pleading motive and opportunity is 
insufficient to meet a cogent and compelling scienter inference.106 Even 
though the court ultimately found the plaintiffs failed to meet the strong 
inference requirement—giving the appearance of compliance with 
Tellabs—the analysis the court used essentially followed the Second 
Circuit’s motive and opportunity test.107 Because Tellabs and the PSLRA 
were meant to toughen pleading requirements for plaintiffs to weed out 
meritless and frivolous claims,108 permitting alternate methods to establish 
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scienter seems wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s 
decision.109 
The Second Circuit has similarly continued to apply the motive and 
opportunity test post-Tellabs.110 It asserted that the purpose of Tellabs is to 
be consistent with the PSLRA, which adopted the Second Circuit’s scienter 
standard; therefore, the reasoning continues, use of its previous framework 
must be consistent with the Tellabs rule.111 In ATSI Communications, Inc. v. 
Shaar Fund, Ltd., the plaintiff corporation issued multiple series of 
convertible preferred stock in order to raise capital; the terms of the 
conversion allowed “floorless” convertibles, which are very favorable to 
investors, and less so for the corporation.112 In the complaint, plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants manipulated the market by short selling the 
plaintiffs’ common stock and then converting the preferred stock into 
common stock to cover their short position.113 Even though the court 
affirmed dismissal of the complaint because plaintiff failed to allege a 
compelling inference of scienter, its test still allowed the plaintiff to satisfy 
the scienter requirement by: (1) “showing that the defendants had both 
motive and opportunity to commit the fraud or (2) constituting strong 
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.”114 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court left unanswered what degree of 
recklessness may establish a strong inference of scienter.115 However, it 
seems doubtful that the Second Circuit’s flexibility in allowing plaintiffs to 
rely on the bare allegation of motive and opportunity is consistent with the 
Tellabs rule.116 
Prior to Tellabs, the Third Circuit had formally adopted the Second 
Circuit’s position in In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation.117 However, 
in Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., the Third Circuit, relying on 
Tellabs, decided that as a general rule, “motive and opportunity” may no 
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longer serve as an independent route to show scienter.118 In Avaya, 
shareholders brought a class action against the company for making 
misstatements regarding the company’s earnings growth potential despite 
the presence of price competition.119 The court ultimately found that parts 
of the plaintiffs’ pleading were sufficiently particular and established a 
strong inference of scienter, while other statements did not.120 In its analysis 
of the complaint as a whole, the court explicitly rejected the “motive and 
opportunity” test.121 The court reasoned that, in light of Tellabs’ instruction 
to compare competing inferences, 
[i]t cannot be said that, in every conceivable situation in which an 
individual makes a false or misleading statement and has a strong motive 
and opportunity to do so, the nonculpable explanations will necessarily not 
be more compelling than the culpable ones. And if that is true, then 
allegations of motive and opportunity are not entitled to a special, 
independent status.122 
While it appears as though the Third Circuit altered its test due to 
Tellabs, scholars argue that the practical implications of eliminating the 
motive and opportunity test reflect few changes in pleadings' actual 
success.123 In practice, generalized theories of motive have “rarely saved a 
complaint from dismissal” and few motive theories have passed muster in 
the Third Circuit post-PSLRA.124 And even though eliminating the “motive 
and opportunity” test did not drastically alter the way securities fraud 
actions are pled, the decision was significant in its outright rejection of the 
Second Circuit’s standard, which gave motive and opportunity special 
independent status.125 Furthermore, it ought to be recognized that the reason 
for this rejection was the court’s consideration of the Supreme Court’s 
instructions given in Tellabs.126 These circuits ostensibly adhered to the 
Tellabs rule by considering all the allegations together as a whole. 
However, in the analyses of these courts’ decisions, there seemed to be 
leeway in how the courts found scienter, or lack of it. Such judicial 
discretion may be problematic for plaintiffs in determining how to plead a 
case; however, it also may be beneficial to plaintiffs because now judges 
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have some latitude when looking at the bigger picture of the aggregate 
claims.  
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
The Ninth Circuit has always been the most temperamental in 
determining a standard for a strong inference of scienter.127 As circuit courts 
cannot outright reject controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth 
Circuit must abide by Tellabs. However, since the Tellabs rule was 
insufficiently explicit, it could not prevent the Ninth Circuit from 
reconciling its established standard with the rule. Soon after Tellabs, it 
maintained, in Metzler Investment GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., that 
its Silicon Graphics holding, decided prior to Tellabs, was still viable; to 
achieve the requisite scienter, plaintiff must show a “strong inference of 
deliberate recklessness,” a standard that evidence of motive and opportunity 
alone were not enough to satisfy.128 The court even suggested that Tellabs’ 
holistic review of the complaint required scienter to be individually 
established for each allegation.129 
In Metzler, plaintiffs brought an action against Corinthian, operator of 
private for-profit vocational colleges, claiming that it was manipulating 
student enrollment figures to acquire additional federal funding.130 The 
Metzler court held that plaintiffs failed to allege facts that revealed 
widespread financial aid manipulation by operator and that plaintiffs cannot 
rely “on an isolated statement that stands in contrast to a host of other 
insufficient allegations.”131 The court concluded that even though Tellabs’ 
holistic application prohibits “de-contextualization,” it still “requires a 
coherent theory of wrongdoing.”132 
A month later, the Ninth Circuit decided South Ferry LP v. Killinger, 
and concluded that while Tellabs did not overrule its earlier decisions, its 
previous standard may be “too demanding and focused too narrowly” under 
the new rule.133 The Ninth Circuit appeared reluctant in its prior statements 
regarding Tellabs’ insignificance134 and acceded to its holistic approach.135 
South Ferry seemed to indicate that the Ninth Circuit was prepared to take 
Tellabs into full consideration.136 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 128. Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 129. Id. See also Gareth T. Evans & Alexander K. Mircheff, Pleading Scienter in the Ninth 
Circuit: Did Tellabs Really Change Much?, 4 BLOOMBERG LAW REP., Sec. Law., Jan. 4, 2011, 
74, 76–77. 
 130. Metzler Inv., 540 F.3d at 1055. 
 131. Id. at 1069. See also Evans & Mircheff, supra note 129, at 77. 
 132. Evans & Mircheff, supra note 129, at 76, 77 (citing Metzler Inv., 540 F.3d at 1069). 
 133. Id. at 77 (quoting South Ferry LP No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 134. Evans & Mircheff, supra note 129, at 77. 
 135. South Ferry, 542 F.3d at 784; Evans & Mircheff, supra note 129, at 77. 
 136. South Ferry, 542 F.3d at 784; Evans & Mircheff, supra note 129, at 77. 
2011] Scienter After Tellabs 541 
In early 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided Zucco,137 which involved 
claims that the defendant corporation purposefully overstated its earnings 
and wrongfully capitalized expenditures that ought to have been 
expensed.138 The court’s tone contrasted dramatically with the South Ferry 
opinion, but the court acknowledged and addressed head-on the tension and 
issues between the Tellabs rule and the Ninth Circuit’s existing scienter 
jurisprudence.139 In its attempt to reconcile the two standards, the Ninth 
Circuit developed a new test.140 The court conducted a dual inquiry, in 
which it would first “‘determine whether any of the plaintiff’s allegations, 
standing alone, are sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter’” and 
then, if no individual allegations are sufficient, the court will “‘conduct a 
‘holistic’ review of the same allegations to determine whether the 
[individually] insufficient allegations combine to create a strong 
inference.’”141 
Though the Zucco plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court implicitly 
rejected the individual allegation approach previously taken by the Ninth 
Circuit, the court concluded that “‘Tellabs does not materially alter the 
particularity requirements for scienter claims established in [our] previous 
decisions.’”142 Under its analysis, the court found the plaintiffs’ individual 
allegations did not sufficiently plead scienter.143 Thus, following its dual 
inquiry, the court reviewed all the allegations collectively, noting that 
“‘[e]ven if a set of allegations may create an inference of scienter greater 
than the sum of its parts, it must still be at least as compelling as an 
alternative innocent explanation.’”144 With this in mind, the court wrote no 
more than a mere paragraph on its holistic review, and quickly found that 
the allegations were “‘not as cogent or compelling as a plausible alternative 
inference.’”145 The “brevity [of the court’s] holistic review” compared to 
the depth of its evaluation of the individual scienter allegations suggests 
that Tellabs’ impact on the Ninth Circuit is no more than a mere 
afterthought.146 
Under this new two-prong analysis, if a plaintiff’s allegations are not 
individually strong enough to meet the scienter requirement, then it seems 
plaintiffs are given a second opportunity to have their allegations 
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considered holistically as required in Tellabs.147 It is inherently more 
difficult and places a stronger burden on the plaintiff to plead allegations 
that will individually meet the requisite standard.148 By still requiring 
plaintiffs to pass the individual allegations test, the Ninth Circuit essentially 
undercuts the significance of the Tellabs rule.149 Even though the court is 
willing to apply the Tellabs rule once a complaint has failed the first prong 
of the test, it would appear that this use of Tellabs does not conform to the 
purpose of the Supreme Court decision. Tellabs was meant to harmonize 
circuits, by bringing the extremes towards the middle ground. While the 
Ninth Circuit is putatively applying Tellabs, it is implicitly ignoring the 
harmonization sought by the Supreme Court by retaining its former test and 
treating it with relative primacy over the Tellabs approach. 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, Tellabs is the backstop to the Ninth 
Circuit’s more stringent standard. The court does not place an additional 
burden on the plaintiff, but by first examining the strength of scienter for 
each allegation individually, the Ninth Circuit’s test indirectly clashes with 
the Tellabs rule. Further, such an analysis may prejudice the strength of 
certain allegations in the judge’s mind when he conducts a second holistic 
review of all the allegations together. The purpose of Tellabs was to 
enhance uniformity and predictability for both courts and plaintiffs.150 
However, by preserving its former test and using the Tellabs rule as a mere 
backstop, the Ninth Circuit failed to whole-heartedly adopt the goals of 
Tellabs.151 
Soon after Zucco, in Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., the court followed 
the dual approach and swiftly affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.152 
Rubke involved claims against the defendant corporation for deliberately 
understating stock value subject to a pending tender offer.153 Defendant 
allegedly called key minority shareholders and made various false 
statements so that the company could purchase shares at below market 
value.154 The court examined the scienter allegations relating to the 
telephone calls, and much like in Zucco, concluded that the allegations did 
not individually support a strong inference of scienter.155 After examining 
the allegations separately, the court then conducted a brief holistic review 
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only to conclude, again, that the allegations as a whole still were not strong 
enough to infer scienter.156 
In Zucco, the court observed that in few instances the allegations “may 
create an inference of scienter greater than the sum of its parts,”157 but often 
times, it seems the intense scrutiny of the individual allegations prejudices 
the holistic review of the set of allegations. As such, the additional Tellabs 
inquiry appears to have had little effect on the Ninth Circuit’s preexisting 
analysis.158 So while the Ninth Circuit may have expressed initial desires to 
integrate the Tellabs rule,159 it seems as if the dual approach160 fails to 
incorporate the goals of Tellabs. In practicality for plaintiffs pleading in the 
Ninth Circuit, this means essentially having to meet a stricter standard than 
plaintiffs in other circuits. This would require more work at the start of an 
action to ensure an inference of scienter is found, and would create a 
proclivity for plaintiffs to forum shop. 
C. THE FIRST, FIFTH, SIXTH, AND D.C. CIRCUITS 
Other circuits have adjusted their former standards to comply with the 
Tellabs rule in a manner that seems wholly consistent with the rule’s 
goals.161 The Fifth Circuit, which previously supported a more lenient 
standard for scienter,162 recently affirmed the dismissal of a complaint 
specifically for its failure to meet the Tellabs scienter requirement.163 
In Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund Inc. v. TXU Corp.,164 
the complaint focuses on the plaintiffs’ claim that the “defendants 
misrepresented the dividend policy and an eventual dividend increase to 
induce [plaintiffs] to tender their shares.”165 The court applied the Tellabs 
rule and understood it to be a four-step test requiring that: “(1) all 
allegations must be assumed to be true; (2) the facts must be viewed 
collectively and not in isolation; (3) the court must consider plausible 
inferences opposing as well as supporting a strong inference of scienter; and 
(4) omissions and ambiguities count against an inference of scienter.”166 
The court noted that allegations of motive and opportunity, although 
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previously permitted to satisfy scienter, now “‘standing alone will not 
suffice to meet the scienter requirement,’” but may be used to strengthen 
the scienter inference.167 Next, the court examined the facts and considered 
“opposing inference,” and held that since the company did “disclose[] that 
the dividend policy was under review during the tender period,” the 
“‘inference of non-fraudulent intent weigh[ed] in favor of the’ 
[Appellees].”168 
Similarly, in Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Electrical 
Services Inc., the Fifth Circuit dismissed a class action securities fraud 
claim against defendants, “an electrical contracting service company and . . 
. its officers” for lack of scienter.169 The court found that there was no 
sufficient link between the misstatements regarding internal controls and 
the actual failed reporting.170 Further, the court reviewed the collective 
impact of the allegations and found it was not strong enough to infer 
scienter.171 As such, the Fifth Circuit modified its previous test and 
conducted a scienter analysis that is wholly consistent with the goals of 
Tellabs.172 
The First and Sixth Circuits similarly tailored their previous tests to 
conform to the Tellabs rule. Both ultimately concluded that the Supreme 
Court’s decision lowered the plaintiff’s burden for pleadings from each 
circuit’s preexisting tests.173 
Previously, the First Circuit had held that if two competing inferences 
were equally strong, then the finding will be in favor of the defendant.174 In 
Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Boston Scientific 
Corp., the company’s officers withheld material information about 
problems with its new product and its eventual recall.175 Under the Tellabs 
rule, the court held that if a plaintiff’s inferences were at least equally as 
strong as the defendant’s, then the plaintiff’s case would survive a motion 
to dismiss.176 The court reasoned it “‘cannot hold plaintiffs to a standard 
that would effectively require them, pre-discovery, to plead evidence.’”177 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that a strong inference of 
scienter is satisfied when it is at least as compelling as other plausible 
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inferences, and did not require it to be more compelling.178 The First Circuit 
understood this analysis to be a lower standard, permitting rulings in favor 
of plaintiffs so long as their claim is just as compelling. Thus, it has 
continued to apply the Tellabs rule with this understanding in later cases, 
reversing its previous test.179 
The Sixth Circuit similarly lowered its previous test in light of Tellabs, 
but in a different manner. In Frank v. Dana, shareholders alleged that the 
CEOs caused the corporation to use a variety of accounting manipulations 
to falsify its financial results, which harmed shareholders who had 
purchased artificially inflated stocks.180 The court reviewed a case that was 
dismissed because the controlling pleading standard in the Sixth Circuit 
required plaintiffs to plead the “‘most plausible of competing inferences’” 
in order to meet the requisite scienter.181 The court held that the “most 
plausible” standard is no longer good law.182 The “most plausible” standard 
was based on an understanding that the PSLRA entitled plaintiffs only to 
such.183 However, the court concluded in Frank v. Dana that Tellabs 
instructs for a finding in favor of the plaintiff if there are two equally 
compelling competing inferences.184 Thus, a plaintiff’s complaint would 
survive a motion to dismiss so long as the inference of scienter was “at 
least as compelling as any opposing inferences.”185 Employing an analysis 
similar to that of the First Circuit, the Sixth Circuit understood Tellabs to 
lower the pleading burden for plaintiffs such that they only need an 
inference that is equally compelling, giving plaintiffs the benefit of the 
doubt.186 
The District of Columbia Circuit also handed down similar decisions 
emphasizing that Tellabs instructed the courts to review all the allegations 
in toto in light of any plausible non-fraudulent intent.187 In following 
Tellabs’ prescriptions, the court conformed its analyses to adhere to the 
Supreme Court’s goals.188 The circuits that have incorporated Tellabs in 
form and spirit fully understood the Court’s desire to provide plaintiffs with 
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a more stable approach to plead securities fraud claims and to lessen the 
burden of frivolous claims on the court system.  
IV. THE TELLABS RULE’S INTERPRETIVE DISCRETION 
In Tellabs, the Supreme Court specifically declined to choose one 
circuit’s standard over another’s, even though the PSLRA standard for 
scienter is modeled after the Second Circuit’s. Instead, the Court prescribed 
a holistic approach to finding scienter, such that circuit courts could 
incorporate their previous methods into the Tellabs approach.189 While both 
the PSLRA and Tellabs sought to achieve a uniform standard among the 
circuits, the Supreme Court also recognized the difficulties in reconciling a 
variety of circuit standards. Thus, the Court opted for an approach that 
hopefully would achieve enough harmonization for consistency, but also 
stringent enough to limit frivolous securities fraud lawsuits; this would help 
to increase predictability in case outcomes, and would lessen the risk of 
forum shopping by plaintiffs.190 Because of the difficulty in creating such a 
standard, the Court crafted a test that would include all the various circuits’ 
standards; hence, the holistic approach. Some scholars theorized that the 
Supreme Court avoided the issue in not creating an exacting pleading 
standard, and others postulate that the Court’s approach actually benefits 
defendants.191 However, this kind of interpretive flexibility afforded to 
lower federal courts is not as flawed as some may suggest, and even could 
be a good thing. Even though plaintiffs may desire an absolute uniform 
standard, there are benefits to giving judges some interpretive latitude. A 
determination of scienter sometimes requires judges to look beyond the 
facts to the nuances of the case.192 Proving the mental state of a defendant is 
already difficult; thus, by allowing judges to look holistically at all of the 
claims to get the bigger picture, they are able to come to a more equitable 
conclusion. For this reason, it is possible the Supreme Court purposefully 
constructed the holistic approach in Tellabs. The Court tried to reach a 
happy medium between two very extreme circuits, the Second and the 
Ninth. Knowing neither would stray far from its former approaches, the 
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Tellabs Court decided to allow essentially all forms of pleading so long as 
judges base their finding on all of the alleged claims. For example, the 
motive and opportunity test, though not utterly unfavorable, had lost much 
of its appeal as an independent route to scienter because now judges must 
base the strength of the inference on all of the claims, not just claims 
involving motive and opportunity.193 The Court’s methodology sought to 
heighten the pleading standard by using a more nuanced approach, rather 
than the rigid check box system other circuits had established. This afforded 
judges some flexibility, but other requirements, such as comparing the 
culpable and non-culpable inferences against each other, helped to guard 
against abuses of discretion. Ultimately, this comprehensive rule has 
harmonized the circuits such that there should be sufficient consistency and 
the circuit courts do not feel encroached upon because they were given 
enough freedom to deliberate the nuances of each case. Nevertheless, 
because of this latitude, circuits are able to maintain their former tests and, 
simultaneously, outwardly adopt Tellabs. However, judicial discretion is 
not always adverse to harmonization. 
CONCLUSION 
This note has illustrated the difficulties numerous circuits experienced 
in reconciling the Tellabs rule with their former tests.194 Some circuits have 
decidedly disregarded Tellabs’ call for more evidentiary proof of an 
inference of scienter by still permitting bare allegations of motive and 
opportunity to satisfy a strong inference of scienter.195 The Ninth Circuit 
attempted to harmonize Tellabs by creating a two-pronged test, in which it 
first reviews individual allegations, and secondly conducts a holistic review 
of the allegations as instructed in Tellabs.196 Though the Ninth Circuit 
attempted to incorporate Tellabs, the new test has not significantly changed 
the court’s outcomes regarding scienter. Lastly, this note presented circuit 
courts that have adjusted their previous tests to abide by the goals set forth 
in Tellabs.197 
Consequently, it appears that while many circuits have changed their 
previous frameworks in consideration of Tellabs, these changes have had no 
great effect on how the circuits continue to define the requisite scienter 
standard. The purpose of Tellabs and of the PSLRA was to reform the 
circuit courts’ approaches to finding inferences of scienter such that the 
tests across the circuits are uniform.198 The Supreme Court, in an effort to 
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achieve the goals of the PSLRA, established a holistic test that would allow 
circuit courts to incorporate other tests so long as the allegations are 
considered in their entirety. Though this test has not achieved complete 
harmonization among the circuits, especially between the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, Tellabs’ guidance was not completely wasted; several circuits, 
such as the First, Fifth, and Sixth have employed a more unified scienter 
analysis. Further, the Third Circuit, which previously followed the Second 
Circuit’s test, has expressly rejected motive and opportunity as a separate 
means to scienter.199 Moreover, an absolute unification of the circuit courts’ 
tests may not be necessary to achieve consistency and a heightened 
standard. The interpretive discretion Tellabs left to judges does not blatantly 
go against harmonization, but rather recognizes that there is a benefit to 
allowing judges some flexibility, particularly for nuanced concepts, and that 
determinations of scienter sometimes warrant such flexibility. 
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